






Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

Current Status of Cyber Security Implementation

Insights on the use of consequence based guidance

- Worked with industry to endorse a consequence-based process to allow a graded approach to assessment of Critical Digital Assets (CDAs).
- Consequence screening process to enable licensees to screen low consequence CDAs and credit existing programs in lieu of additional cyber security controls and analysis
- CDAs that directly impact a Safety, Security and Emergency Preparedness (SSEP) function require full analysis as discussed in Regulatory Guide 5.71
- Balance of Plant systems require at minimum equivalent protection to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection standards
- Low consequence CDAs need controls to ensure:
 - Redundant means to detect CDA compromise
 - Adequate time to detect, assess and respond
 - Procedures, equipment and training in place to mitigate the cyber event
 - Common Milestone 1-7 controls

Inspection Results



Milestones

Implementation of the operating power reactor cyber security plans (CSPs) is divided into two phases.

- The interim cyber security milestones (Milestones 1-7) were completed at all power reactors on 12/31/2012. NRC inspection staff is in the process of verifying implementation.
- Milestone 8 Full Plan implementation varies by site between late 2014 and 2017.

Overview of Cyber Security Roadmap Activities

The Roadmap was issued as a publically available Commission Information paper to give the Commission an update on cyber security for operating power reactors and combined license applicants and the staff's plan for evaluating cyber security for NRC's other licensees. Current status:

Fuel Cycle Facilities: NRC staff has conducted site visits and is considering undertaking a rulemaking.

Non-Power Reactors: Four site visits have been conducted; the final report summarizing observations to be issued in the near future.

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations: Four site visits have been conducted; the final report summarizing observations to be issued in the near future.

Byproduct Materials: NRC Materials Cyber Working Group started in August 2013, with representation from FSME, NSIR, Regional Offices, and Agreement States and is currently in the process of identifying sites appropriate for site visits

